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In City of Ladue v.
Gil/eo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994),
the United States Supreme
Court held that an ordinance
banning homeowners from displaying signs containing personal, political orreligious messages violates the First Amendment because it restricts a cherished means ofcommunication.
In so holding, the Court greatly
curbed municipality police powers to prevent overreaching
regulation of residential signs
and reacknowledged a special
respect for individual liberty in
the home.
Respondent Margaret
P. Gilleo, a resident of Ladue,
Missouri, was prohibited from
displaying a sign in the second
floor window of her home that
stated "For Peace in the Gulf'.
The city of Ladue ("Ladue")
cited a city ordinance as the basis
forGilleo'sviolation Theordinance
prohibited homeowners from
displaying signs on their property, with the exception of"res idential identification" signs,
"for sale" signs, and safety hazard signs. The ordinance allowed further exceptions to this
sweeping ban by permitting
churches, schools, and nonprofit groups to display certain
signs not allowed on residential
property. The ordinance recited its principal purpose as
enabling the city to minimize the
visual clutter associated with
the prohibited signs. Gilleo challenged this ordinance by suing
the city ofLadue, its Mayor, and
the members ofthe Ladue City
Council in the United States
District Court for the Eastern
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District ofMissouri, alleging that
the ordinance violated her First
Amendmentrightoffree speech.
After a finding by the
district court that Ladue's sign
ordinance was unconstitutional,
the city appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. In upholding
the district court's decision, the
court ofappeals determined that
the ordinance was a contentbased regulation, and therefore,
unconstitutional. In so holding,
the court of appeals concluded
that the interest of Ladue to
reduce visual clutter was "not
sufficiently compelling" to allow Ladue to treat "commercial speech more favorably than
noncommercial speech" and
favor "some kinds of noncommercial speech over others."
The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the ordinance
violated a Ladue resident's right
to free speech under the First
. Amendment.
In its analysis, the Court
recognized that, while signs are
protected speech under the First
Amendment, physical characteristics of signs can pose problems that are properly subj ectto
regulation under a municipality , s
police powers. Id. at 9. Such
pro blems arise when signs "take
up space and may obstruct views,
distract motorists, [and] displace
alternative uses for land ... "
!d. at 10. However, the Court
pointed out that because signs
are a means of communication,
the regulation of this medium
"inevitably affects communication itself." Id. at 10. Such an
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ordinance can be challenged as
to its constitutionality on two
distinct grounds: the ordinance
restricts too little speech because its exemptions discriminate on the basis of the sign's
messages and, alternatively, the
ordinance simply prohibits too
much speech. !d. at 15-16.
The court of appeals
relied on the notion that the
ordinance restricted too little
speech and was prone to viewpoint and content-based discrimination. Id. at 9. In challenging this holding, Ladue argued that its ordinance banning
certain types ofresidential signs
was to reduce visual clutter and
was content-neutral. Id. at 18.
Its rationale was that only a few
residents would display "for
sale" or "for rent" signs at one
time, thereby not imposing any
threat ofvisual clutter. This reasoning explained the exemptions
for on-site commercial and organizational signs, given the fact
that Ladue only had a few
churches, schools, and businesses. Id. at 18-19.
Rejecting this rationale,
the Supreme Court noted that
Ladue's ban was a total prohibition of residential signs with
only a few exceptions. Therefore, in theory, Ladue could
correct the inadequacies of the
ordinance by simply repealing
all of the exemptions. Id. at 20.
The Court found credence in
the notion that the ordinance,
with its limited exemptions, prohibited too much speech. By
assuming that the ordinance was
content-neutral as Ladue argued, the Court reasoned that

Ladue's "interest in allowing
certain messages to be conveyed
by means of residential signs
outweighs the aesthetic interest
in eliminating outdoor signs"
and that Ladue had not imposed
a flat ban on signs because it had
determined that at least some of
them were too vital to be banned.
!d. at 19-20.
The Court held that by
almost completely banning residential signs, the ordinance totally foreclosed a distinguished
means ofcommunication to personal, political, orreligious messages, and posed a danger to
freedom of speech by eliminating a shared method of communication. Id. at 22-23. The
Court acknowledged that this
form of communication plays a
vital role in society, such as a
person proclaiming his or her
support for a particular candidate in a political campaign. Id.
at 22.
Ladue argued that its
ordinance merely regulated the
"time, place, or manner" of this
speech "because residents remain free to convey their desired messages by other means,
such as hand-held signs, 'letters, handbills, flyers, telephone
calls, newspaper advertisements,
bumper stickers, speeches, and
neighborhood or community
meetings. '" Id. at 25 (quoting
Brieffor Petitioners at 41). The
Court rejected the notion that
these other modes ofcommunication were adequate substitutes·
for noncommercial residential
signs for the following reasons:
1) signs allow the identity ofthe
speaker to be known which lends

to the persuasiveness of a message; 2) signs displayed on a
homeowner's lawn or in a window are relatively inexpensive
whereas the alternatives suggested by Ladue can be very
costly; and 3) signs allow a person to effectively target their
neighbors whereas the alternatives suggested by Ladue cannot reach this audience as successfully. Gil/eo at 25-27.
With its decision in City
of Ladue v. Gilleo, the Supreme Court greatly restricted
a municipality's police powers
in prohibiting residential signs
containing personal, political,
or religious messages. In so
doing, the Court reaffirmed the
law's respect for individual liberty in the home and its special
protection of the exercise of
free speech. The Court concluded that the suppression of
this speech evokes a dangerous
pattern of governmental constraints on pri vate behavior that
would jeopardize a form ofcommunication unique in its broad
access to the public and its effectiveness in carrying its message to its targeted audience.
Recognizing these dangers, the
Supreme Court, with its holding, protected the right to this
form ofspeech for all American
citizens.
- Andrea S. Holz
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